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I. INTRODUCTION
The treatment of attorneys under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA)' has been subject to numerous changes
since the Act's inception in 1977.2 Throughout the history of the
FDCPA, Congress and courts have struggled to strike a balance
between (1) the extent to which attorneys must be regulated to
accomplish the Act's purposes and (2) the increased burden that
heightened regulation entails for the legal profession.3 The most
recent development in the context of this struggle is a provision of
the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 (FSRRA),4
which provides that the filing of a complaint does not constitute an
initial communication for purposes of the validation notices
required by section 809 of the FDCPA (§ 1692g).5 Thus, collection
attorneys who merely litigate collection cases are exempted from
the requirements of § 1692g.6 This new amendment to the
FDCPA helps alleviate a significant burden previously imposed on
litigating collection attorneys under § 1692g without sacrificing
consumer protection, and accordingly moves closer to striking the
appropriate balance between attorney and consumer interests
under the FDCPA.7
1. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2000)
[hereinafter FDCPA].
2. See Neil Simon, Comment, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act After
Heintz v. Jenkins: A Practical Examination of the End of the Exemption, 46 EMORY
L.J. 389, 407-19 (1997).
3. See id.
4. Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351,
§ 802(a), 120 Stat. 1966 (2006) [hereinafter FSRRA].
5. Id. Hereinafter the validation notice requirements of section 809 of the
FDCPA will be referred to by its section number as codified in the United States
Code, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.
6. See id.
7. See Helen W. Gunnarsson, Thomas: Another Twist in the Fair-Debt Collection
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Part II of this Note will discuss the purpose of the FDCPA
and address the requirements that § 1692g imposes upon those
falling within its purview." Part III will briefly examine the history
of the FDCPA and the evolution of its applicability to attorneys.9
Part IV will analyze the history and purpose of the FSRRA, with
particular emphasis on section 802, which exempts legal pleadings
from the validation notice requirements.'0 Part V will discuss the
implications of the new legislation for attorneys with debt
collection practices as well as for consumers under the FDCPA."
Part VI will conclude by examining the effects of this most recent
change in the context of the competing interests of consumers and
attorneys under the FDCPA.2
II. PURPOSE AND VALIDATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE FDCPA
In 1977, Congress passed the FDCPA to eliminate the
widespread use of unfair and abusive collection practices by debt
collectors. 3 One way in which Congress sought to accomplish this
goal was by requiring the debt collector to notify the consumer of
his or her right to dispute the validity of the debt before further
collection action ensued. 4 By "ensur[ing] that debtors will be
informed about their validation rights, and that debt collectors,
knowing that they are obliged to advise debtors of these rights, will
investigate claims before initiating litigation to collect debts,"
Congress hoped such a requirement would prevent "unfair,
harassing, and deceptive debt collection practices."' 5
Knot, 93 ILL. B.J. 64, 64 (2005) (discussing the burden imposed on collection
attorneys under an alternative regime); Simon, supra note 2, at 394-95 (explaining
consumers can adequately monitor the actions of creditors without the need for
additional protection under the FDCPA).
8. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 18-65 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 66-86 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 87-161 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (1977) (amended 1986); see also Simon, supra note 2,
at 392 (examining the history and purposes of the FDCPA).
14. See § 1692g.




Under § 1692g, a debt collector must send the consumer
written notification containing the following five things within five
days of its initial communication with the consumer regarding the
debt:
(1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the
creditor to whom it is owed; (3) a statement that
unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt
of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any
portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid
by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the
consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within
the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion
thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain
verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment
against the consumer and a copy of such verification
or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the
debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the
consumer's written request within the thirty-day
period, the debt collector will provide the consumer
with the name and address of the original creditor, if
different from the current creditor.1
6
If a debt collector fails to comply with the validation notice
requirements in § 1692g, the debt collector could be liable for any
actual damages sustained as a result of its failure, as well as
statutory damages and the costs of the action, including attorney's
fees.
17
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000).
17. § 1692k(a).
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III. HISTORY OF THE FDCPA AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO
ATTORNEYS
A. Original Form of the FDCPA and the Implied Litigation
Exemption
In its original form, the FDCPA only applied to third-party
debt collectors who were collecting consumer debts as a "principal
purpose" of their business or on a "regular" basis.18 The original
FDCPA specifically exempted from the definition of debt collector
"any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of
and in the name of a client."' 9 This provision made the FDCPA
inapplicable to attorneys, even if their practice would have
otherwise fallen within the purview of the Act.20
In 1986, the attorney exemption to the FDCPA was
repealed2 1 in an attempt to bring attorneys within the scope of theS• 22
Act and subject them to liability for violations of its provisions.
Although the repeal of the attorney exemption made it clear that
attorneys could now qualify as debt collectors under the FDCPA,
the amended Act failed to address circumstances in which
attorneys would qualify as such23 This left significant room for
courts to interpret the applicability of the FDCPA to attorneys.24
Even after the repeal of the attorney exemption, a strict
reading of the statute still implied that not all activities of
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1977) (amended 1986); see also Simon, supra note 2,
at 395. Courts have taken various approaches as to the amount of collection activity
that is needed to subject attorneys to the Act. Some courts have focused on the
percentage of legal fees that were generated from collection activities in determining
whether debt collection constitutes a "principal purpose" of the attorney's business.
Other courts have focused on the volume of the attorney's business generated by
collection activities or the amount of time spent by the attorney on such in
determining whether the activities were sufficiently "regular" to bring the attorney
within the purview of the Act. Simon, supra note 2, at 395.
19. § 1692a(6)(F).
20. See Simon, supra note 2, at 407 ("In its original form, the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act specifically exempted attorneys from its requirements.").
21. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768
(1986) (prior to 2006 amendment).
22. See Simon, supra note 2, at 409-10.
23. Id. at 410 (noting the amended FDCPA appeared inapplicable to attorneys





attorneys fell within the scope of the FDCPA.25 Because the
provisions of the FDCPA were only applicable to those engaged in
the "collection" of debts, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
26
took the position that attorneys engaged solely in litigation
activities relating to debt collection were not subject to the Act's
requirements.27 In its 1988 Commentary to the FDCPA, the FTC
excluded "an attorney whose practice is limited to legal activities
(e.g., the filing and prosecution of lawsuits to reduce debts to
judgment)" from the definition of a debt collector, thereby
28rendering the FDCPA inapplicable in such a context. Although
several courts followed the approach taken by the FTC in its
nonbinding commentary, others did not.29 Thus, a split among the
circuits developed as to the extent the activities of attorneys were
governed by the FDCPA. °
B. Supreme Court's Holding in Heintz v. Jenkins
The Supreme Court resolved the split as to the status of
litigating collection attorneys under § 1692g in 1995 when it
decided Heintz v. Jenkins." In Heintz, Jenkins borrowed money
from a bank to buy a car and eventually defaulted on her loan."
The bank's law firm filed suit in state court in the name of its bank
client to recover the balance due from Jenkins.33 In an effort to
settle the suit, one of the bank's attorneys, George Heintz, wrote a
letter to Jenkins' attorney stating that she owed a balance of
25. Id.
26. The FTC is the administrative agency placed in charge of enforcement of the
provisions of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 16921 (2000).
27. Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed Reg. 50097 (Dec. 13, 1988) [hereinafter FTC
Staff Commentary]. The FTC's rationale for its position was that attorneys engaged
solely in litigation were not "collecting" debts but merely reducing debts to judgment
and therefore should not be subject to the provisions of the FDCPA. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Simon, supra note 2, at 411-15. While the Sixth Circuit followed the
implied litigation exemption advocated by the FTC, the Third, Fourth, and Seventh
Circuits all rejected such an approach and made the provisions of the Act applicable
to all collection attorneys even if their activities consisted solely of litigation. Id.
30. See id.
31. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995).
32. Id. at 293.
33. Id.
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$4,173.00.34 Jenkins then filed suit, alleging the bank's attorneys
had violated the FDCPA by making a false representation as to
the amount of the debt and trying to collect an amount not
authorized by the loan agreement.35 At trial, the district court
dismissed Jenkins' complaint, holding that the FDCPA did not
apply to lawyers engaged in litigation.36 However, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that
the FDCPA did apply to litigating attorneys despite contrary
interpretations by the FTC and the Sixth Circuit.
In addressing the issue, the Supreme Court held the
FDCPA did apply to collection attorneys solely engaged in
litigation, erasing the implied exemption for litigating attorneys
advocated by the FTC and the Sixth Circuit.38 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court focused on three things: (1) an attorney who
"tries to obtain payment of consumer debts through legal
proceedings" is still attempting to collect consumer debts;39 (2)
when Congress repealed the attorney exemption in 1986, it did so
"in its entirety, without creating a narrower, litigation related
exemption to fill the void;" 4° and (3) the FTC commentary
suggesting an implied litigation exemption was nonbinding.41
After Heintz v. Jenkins, it appeared clear that the requirements of
the FDCPA were applicable to all collection attorneys, regardless




36. Id. at 294.
37. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995); see also Simon, supra note 2, at
410-15 (contrasting both the FTC and Sixth Circuit's implied litigation exemption
approach to the FDCPA with that taken by the Seventh Circuit).
38. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294; see also Simon, supra note 2, at 416 ("The Supreme
Court ... held that 'the Act does apply to lawyers engaged in litigation' . . . activities
while collecting debts.").
39. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294.
40. Id. at 294-95.
41. Id. at 298.
42. Id. at 294.
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C. Applicability to Validation Requirements
Although the Supreme Court made it clear in Heintz v.
Jenkins that attorneys solely engaged in collection activity via
litigation were subject to the FDCPA, it left open the precise
implications of its holding with regards to various requirements of
the Act. 3 One such requirement that was largely left to the
interpretation of subsequent courts was the validation notices
required by § 1692g.4 Specifically, after Heintz, the question
remained as to whether the service of a summons and complaint
upon a consumer by an attorney constitutes an "initial
communication" under the FDCPA, thus subjecting the attorney
to the validation notice requirements found in § 1692g. 5 Courts
addressing this particular issue came out on both sides of the
46question, creating a circuit court split that would only later be
resolved by the eventual passage of section 802 of the FSRRA.47
The debate surrounding the status of a legal pleading as an
initial communication under the FDCPA publicly manifested itself
in 2001 when the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida decided McKnight v. Benitez.48 Despite the
existence of prior holdings to the contrary,49 the McKnight court
held that the "the term 'communication' as used in the Act does
not include a 'legal action' or pleadings or orders connected
therewith."5" The court noted that because the documents served
upon a debtor when filing a lawsuit fall into one of the
aforementioned categories, they cannot constitute an initial
communication under § 1692g, and thus do not require validation
43. See id.
44. See Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, 392 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir.
2004); Vega v. McKay, 351 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2003).
45. Thomas, 392 F.3d at 917.
46. See id. at 920; Vega, 351 F.3d at 1337.
47. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
48. McKnight v. Benitez, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
49. See id. at 1308 (citing Mendus v. Morgan & Assocs, P.C., 994 P.2d 83, 89-90
(Okla. Civ. App. 1999) and Martinez v. Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., 266 B.R.
523 (S.D. Fla. 2001) as two cases which held a complaint is an initial communication
under the FDCPA).
50. McKnight, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
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notices.51 Shortly thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit adopted the approach and reasoning of
the McKnight court in Vega v. McKay,5 establishing that the
Eleventh Circuit did not recognize the service of a summons and
complaint as requiring validation notices under the FDCPA.53
In the year after the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Vega,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reached a contrary decision in Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson &
Cybak.54  The court took the position that the service of a
summons and complaint did constitute an "initial communication"
under the FDCPA, and thus required the § 1692g validation
notices." Subsequent to the Thomas decision, the overwhelming
majority of courts addressing the status of a summons and
complaint under the FDCPA agreed with the Seventh Circuit's
rationale and holding,56 including the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.57 Prior to the enactment of the FSRRA, therefore,
the trend among courts was to treat the service of a summons and
complaint as an initial communication under § 1692g, thus
requiring validation notices to be served in compliance with the
provisions of that statutory section.58
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Heintz v. Jenkins,
the FTC's 1988 Commentary to the FDCPA excluded from the
definition of "communication" any "formal legal action," including
the "filing of a lawsuit or other petition/pleadings with a court;
51. Id.
52. Vega v. McKay, 351 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2003).
53. Id.
54. Compare id. (concluding a complaint constitutes an initial communication for
purposes of the § 1692g validation requirements), with Thomas v. Law Firm of
Simpson & Cybak, 392 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding a complaint does not
constitute an initial communication for purposes of the § 1692g validation
requirements).
55. Thomas, 392 F.3d at 920.
56. See Gough v. Berhhardt & Strawser, P.A., No. 1:05CV00398, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47785 (M.D.N.C. June 30, 2006); Nichols v. Byrd, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D.
Nev. 2006); Thweatt v. Law Firm of Koglmeier, Dobbins, Smith, & Delgado, P.L.C.,
425 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Ariz. 2006);
57. See Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2006).
58. See, e.g., Thomas, 392 F. 3d at 920.
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service of a complaint or other legal papers in connection with a
lawsuit, or activities directly related to such service."'59
After Heintz v. Jenkins, however, the FTC released at least
two Advisory Opinions suggesting it had withdrawn from its
former position in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Heintz. 0 The first opinion letter, issued only two years after
Heintz, simply stated, "[b]ecause of Heintz v. Jenkins, all pleadings
must be considered 'communications' if they convey information
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any
medium., 61  The second opinion letter, issued in 2000, more
specifically addressed "communications" within the context of the
validation notices requirements.6 ' The relevant portion of the
letter reads:
If an attorney debt collector has had no prior
communications with a consumer before serving a
summons or other court document on the consumer,
that document would constitute the "initial
communication" with the consumer if it conveys
information regarding a debt. The attorney would
therefore have to include the written notice mandated
by Section 809(a) (often referred to as the "validation
notice") in the court document itself or send it to the
consumer "within five days after the initial
communication." 63
Thus, based on the trend among courts as well as the position
adopted by the FTC, it appeared that attorneys who merely filed
collection suits on behalf of their clients would be subject to the
59. FTC Staff Commentary, supra note 27.
60. See Federal Trade Commission-Staff Opinion Letter of May 29, 1997,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpa/letters/berger.htm [hereinafter FTC Staff Letter
1]; Federal Trade Commission-Staff Opinion Letter of March 31, 2000,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/fdcpaadvisoryopinion.htm [hereinafter FTC Staff
Letter 2].
61. FTC Staff Letter 1, supra note 60.
62. See FTC Staff Letter 2, supra note 60.
63. Id.
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validation requirements of § 1692g.64 However, the passage of
section 802 of the FSRAA reversed this trend by adopting the
approach advocated by the Eleventh Circuit in Vega v. McKay.65
IV. FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY RELIEF ACT OF 2006
At the time the Seventh Circuit decided Thomas v.
Simpson & Cybak, the court noted the existence of a proposed
congressional bill that could ultimately resolve the circuit court
split by specifically excluding formal pleadings from the definition
of "communication" for purposes of § 1692g.66 House Bill 3066, to
which the Thomas court was referring, addressed necessary
amendments to the FDCPA, including the one previously
mentioned.67 However, the bill was referred to the House
Committee on Financial Services and never resurfaced for a vote
on the floor,68 and the Thomas court had no problem dismissing
the bill's relevance for purposes of its contrary holding.69
Approximately a year and a half after the introduction of
House Bill 3066, a bill with a similar provision regarding the status
of a legal pleading under the FDCPA was introduced in the
House.7° House Bill 3505 entitled the "Financial Services
Regulatory Relief Act of 2005" sought to "provide regulatory
relief and improve productivity for insured depository
institutions." 71 While the majority of the bill focused on
eliminating or amending the requirements facing the lending
institutions themselves, section 902(a) of the bill provided that §
1692g was to be amended by adding a new subsection that
explained, "[a] communication in the form of a formal pleading in
a civil action shall not be treated as an initial communication for
purposes of subsection (a). 7 1 Presumably, such an amendment
64. See supra note 56; FTC Staff Letter 1, supra note 60; FTC Staff Letter 2,
supra note 60.
65. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
66. Thomas, 392 F.3d 914, 918 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004).
67. H.R. 3066, 108th Cong. (2003).
68. See 149 CONG. REC. H8174 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006).
69. Thomas, 392 F.3d at 918 n.2.
70. H.R. 3505, 109th Cong. (2005).
71. Id.
72. Id. H.R. 3505 § 902(a).
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would accomplish the purposes of the bill by lowering compliance
costs for litigating collection attorneys who were hired by financial
institutions to obtain judgments against debtors who failed to meet
their obligations. 73 The attorneys could then pass these savings on
to the depository institutions and ultimately to consumers seeking
credit, thus "restor[ing] vibrancy to the national economy.,
74
The House passed the Financial Services Regulatory Relief
Act of 2005 on March 8, 2006, 7 and sent the bill to the Senate
76Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs for review.
While the Senate Committee was reviewing the proposed
legislation, a bill was introduced by Senator Mike Carpo on May
18, 2006, entitled the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of
2006, which was based largely upon the provisions of H.R. 3505. 77
However, unlike its congressional counterpart, the Senate bill did
not have a provision that exempted legal pleadings from the
definition of an initial communication under § 1692g.'8 The Senate
approved its own version of the Financial Services Regulatory
Relief Act on May 25, 2006, and sent it to the House for
consideration.79
After receiving the bill from the Senate, the House made
several amendments, most notably incorporating the language of
section 902(a) of its own bill into the Senate's version. 80 After this
amendment by the House, section 802 of the Financial Services
Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 reflected the view the House
advocated in its original bill, namely that a complaint does not
73. See H.R. REP. No. 109-356, pt. 1, at 45 (2005) (stating the purpose of the
Financial Services Regulatory Act of 2005 was to allow banks and lending institutions
to devote more resources to lending activities rather than "compliance with outdated
and unneeded regulations" and thus "benefit consumers and the economy by
lowering costs and improving productivity").
74. H.R. REP. No. 109-356, pt. 2, at 2 (2006).
75. 152 CONG. REC. H738 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006).
76. 152 CONG. REC. S1959 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2006).
77. Press Release, House Committee on Financial Services, President Bush Signs
Regulatory Relief Bill (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/
News.asp?FormMode=release&ID=880 [hereinafter House Press Release].
78. S. 2856, 109th Cong. (2006).
79. See 152 CONG. REC. S5272-83 (daily ed. May 25, 2006).
80. See 152 CONG. REC. H7584 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (amending the Senate
version by adding section 802(a) to reflect the language found in section 902(a) of the
House version).
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constitute an initial communication for purposes of the FDCPA
validation notice requirements." The House and the Senate both
passed the bill in its amended form and President George W. Bush
signed the bill into law on October 13, 2006.82 The FSRRA thus
ended the debate regarding the status of a complaint as an initial
communication under § 1692g by adopting the approach taken by
the Eleventh Circuit in Vega v. McKay.83 This approach provides
clarity and eases compliance for litigating collection attorneys
under the FDCPA 84 without significantly impairing consumer
protection.85 For these reasons, the new amendment to the
FDCPA moves closer to establishing the appropriate balance
between consumer and attorney interests under the Act.86
V. STRIKING AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
ATTORNEYS AND CONSUMERS
A. Implications for Collection Attorneys
Had Congress not enacted section 802 of the FSRRA in
contravention to the majority of courts and the FTC, litigating
collection attorneys would have faced difficult compliance issues
87under § 1692g. As it is, Congress' definitive statement that a
formal legal pleading does not constitute an initial communication
for purposes of the FDCPA validation notice requirements greatly
facilitates the practice of law for attorneys litigating collection
88
cases.
81. See FSRRA § 802(a).
82. See 152 Cong. Rec. H7593 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006); 152 Cong. Rec. S10790
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006); House Press Release, supra note 77.
83. See supra notes 52-53, 81-82 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 128-34, 151-54 and accompanying text.
86. See Simon, supra note 2, at 394-95 (explaining consumers can adequately
monitor the actions of creditors without the need for additional protection under the
FDCPA); Gunnarsson, supra note 7, at 64 (discussing the burden imposed on
collection attorneys under an alternative regime).
87. McKnight v. Benitez, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (stating
classifying the service of a summons and complaint as an initial communication
would "wreak[] havoc on the practice of law and legal actions to collect debts").
88. See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
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1. Which Attorneys Will be Affected
The obvious implication of section 802 of the FSSRA is
that in certain contexts, collection attorneys will not be required to
provide the validation notices dictated in § 1692g. 89 Before
examining how this amendment to the FDCPA facilitates the
practice of collection attorneys, it is necessary to clarify the context
in which it does so.
First and foremost, Congress' pronouncement in section
802 that a complaint is not an initial communication does not
affect the practices of all attorneys who may qualify as debt
collectors under the FDCPA.90 An attorney who sends letters to a
debtor in an attempt to collect an overdue payment is
"communicating" with the debtor, and thus must provide the
debtor with the validation notices required by § 1692g within five
days of his initial letter.9' Therefore, if a collection attorney
"communicates" with the debtor before filing a lawsuit, the
FSRRA will not affect the manner in which he conducts his
practice because he is already required to comply with the
validation requirements of § 1692g.92
However, the amendment to § 1692g will benefit those
collection attorneys whose first contact with the debtor is filing a
lawsuit against him or her.93 Despite contrary interpretations by
the majority of courts and the FTC, Congress has exempted
collection attorneys in this context from providing the validation
notices required by § 1692g.94 Because such an approach helps
these "litigating" collection attorneys avoid difficult compliance
89. See FSRRA § 802(a).
90. See id.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2000); Anderson v. Hanna & Assocs., 361 F. Supp. 2d
1379, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (noting letter sent to debtor to collect a debt constituted
an "initial communication" under the FDCPA).
92. See § 1692g.
93. See Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, 392 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir.
2004) (requiring an attorney debt collector whose initial communication with a
debtor is the service of a summons and complaint upon him or her to also serve the
section 809 validation notices).
94. See FSRRA § 802(a).
2007]
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issues under the FDCPA, the § 1692g amendment greatly assists
the process of reducing debts to judgments.95
2. How Attorneys Will be Affected
Had Congress explicitly or implicitly adopted the contrary
interpretation advocated by the majority of courts and the FTC, it
would have likely forced litigating collection attorneys to
significantly alter the way they conduct their practices in order to
satisfy the validation requirements. 96 Under the FDCPA, the
content of the communication containing the validation notices
must not "contradict or overshadow" the Act's notification
requirements so as to make the "least sophisticated consumer
uncertain as to his or her rights under the Act." 97 This becomes
exceedingly difficult for attorneys to avoid where different time
constraints exist for disputing the debt under the FDCPA and for
filing an answer to the complaint under the Rules of Civil
Procedure.98
Section 1692g provides the debtor with thirty days to
dispute the validity of the debt.99 However, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, as well as the corresponding rules of many states,
only allow a defendant twenty days to serve an answer to a
complaint.'0° When these different time constraints exist, courts
have been willing to find that the rights of the debtor under the
FDCPA are "overshadowed" by the procedural requirements of
the summons and complaint when the validation notices are
attached to such, and thus are ineffective to comply with § 1692g.'O
Although differing time constraints are the most common
scenario in which this concept of "contradiction or
95. See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
96. See Gunnarsson, supra note 7, at 64.
97. Mendus v. Morgan & Assocs., 994 P.2d 83, 89 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999).
98. See id. at 92.
99. 15 U.S.C. 1692g (2000).
100. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A); Mendus, 994 P.2d at 88 (noting that the
Oklahoma Pleading Code provides a judgment could be rendered in twenty days if
no answer is filed). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 12(a)(1) (2006) (providing
defendant thirty days rather than twenty to serve his answer to the complaint).
101. Mendus, 994 P.2d at 92.
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overshadowing" occurs, the content of a complaint may still
arguably "contradict or overshadow" the validation notices even if
the time constraints for answering the complaint and disputing the
debt are the same.' °2 In this circumstance, although there are no
"contradictory" statements as to filing deadlines, a court may
nevertheless find the mere fact that the validation notices were
served with a lawsuit "obscures the information required by the
Act," and therefore does not provide the requisite notification to
the debtor proscribed by § 1692g.0 3 Thus, even where there is no
contradictory information in the document, a collection attorney
who provides the validation notices with the complaint still runs a
significant risk of violating the FDCPA and subjecting himself to
liability under the Act.'°4
Those in opposition to the enactment of section 802 of the
FSRRA suggest this overshadowing problem can be cured simply
by using "safe harbor" language. However, it is possible that a
court will nonetheless find the standardized language confusing to
the "least sophisticated consumer, 10 6 and therefore ineffective to
fulfill the validation requirements of § 1692g.' 7 Further, even if
this safe harbor language provides sufficient notice, "some states
prohibit the inclusion of other documents with . . . [a]
102. See id. at 89-90 (noting there are two tests to determine if the validation
notices are contradicted or overshadowed by other content in the notice: (1) whether
information exists that is inconsistent with the Act's required notice (such as differing
response times as discussed above); or (2) whether there are any statements that,
although not clearly contradictory, nevertheless obscures information required by the
Act).
103. See id. at 89 (qualifying under the second test enumerated by the court).
104. See id. at 89-90.
105. Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, 392 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2004).
The Thomas court suggests the following language to accomplish this purpose: "This
advice pertains to your dealings with me as a debt collector. It does not affect your
dealings with the court, and in particular it does not change the time at which you
must answer the complaint. The summons is a command from the court, not from
me, and you must follow its instructions even if you dispute the validity of the debt.
The advice in this letter also does not affect my relations with the court. As a lawyer,
I may file papers in the suit according to the court's rules and the judge's
instructions." Id. at 919-20.
106. Mendus v. Morgan & Assocs., 994 P.2d 83, 89 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999).
107. See Gunnarsson, supra note 7, at 64 (noting at least one federal court has
found the "safe harbor" language of the Seventh Circuit ineffective to comply with
the validation notice requirements of § 1692g).
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complaint."'08 Thus, even if the complaint containing the
validation notices adequately informs the debtor of his or her
rights under § 1692g, a court may throw the case out because it
fails to comply with its local rules.' °9 All of this serves to
demonstrate that when a complaint constitutes an initial
communication under § 1692g, compliance with the validation
requirements is not as simple as just attaching the § 1692g notices
to the body of the complaint." °
Because of the significant risk associated with filing the
validation notices with a complaint, the best option for collection
attorneys under a regime where a complaint constitutes an initial
communication would be to file the validation notices either
before the complaint is filed or within five days thereafter."
However, both of these options entail expensive and time-
consuming modifications to the way that collection attorneys
conduct their practice."12 In the case of waiting to provide the
validation notices until after the complaint has been served, the
attorney must set up a system of safeguards and checks that ensure
he is providing the validation notices within the five-day time
constraint. " ' In addition, he must take the time to type up a
separate document and pay to have it served upon the debtor.14 If
the attorney opts to serve the validation notices before filing his
complaint, he must necessarily delay the litigation process until the
thirty-day period to dispute the debt has expired, since any request
by the debtor to verify the debt requires the attorney to cease any
further collection efforts, including pursuing the adjudication of a
lawsuit. "5 Further, providing this kind of advance notice to the
108. Thomas, 392 F.3d at 919.
109. See id.
110. See McKnight v. Benitez, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306 (noting that courts have
found validation notices to be ineffective both when attached to the complaint or





115. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2000); Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, 392
F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2004).
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debtor allows him to shift assets to avoid any future collection
efforts by the attorney and the creditor he represents.'
16
It is clear, therefore, that treating a complaint as an initial
communication under § 1692g imposes a significant burden on
litigating collection attorneys who are trying to comply with the
validation requirement. " ' By refusing to treat a complaint as an
initial communication requiring validation notices, Congress has
saved attorneys whose first contact with the debtor is the initiation
of a lawsuit the headache of trying to figure out how to best
comply with the requirements of § 1692g. "8 Accordingly, section
802 of the FSRRA relieves this excess burden on these collection
attorneys and makes the process of reducing overdue debts to
judgments relatively straight forward and simple. " 9
B. Implications for Consumers
Congress originally sought to help curb unfair and abusive
debt collection practices by requiring debt collectors to serve
validation notices with their initial communication or within five
days thereafter.'20 Such notices advise the debtor of his rights to
halt any further collection activity by the debt collector until the
debt collector has complied with the consumer's request to verify
the debt.121 One of the main concerns for the Thomas court was
that if a complaint were not treated as an initial communication, it
would create a significant loophole to the validation requirement
of § 1692g that would eventually erode the requirement
altogether. 122 Indeed, many consumer advocate groups are
completely opposed to the new amendment, citing it as a
deprivation of one of the essential rights guaranteed under the
FDCPA, which may result in consumers having "default
judgments entered against them for debts that they do not owe.
123
116. See Gunnarsson, supra note 7, at 64.
117. See id.
118. See FSRRA, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802(a), 120 Stat. 1966 (2006).
119. See id.
120. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
121. See 15 U.S.C § 1692g (2000).
122. Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, 392 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2004).
123. The Consumer Impact of Regulatory Relief Proposals Affecting Banks,
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Because of the sufficiently narrow context in which the
amendment's validation exemption applies, however, it appears
that those in opposition to the new amendment are overstating its
impact on consumer protection under the FDCPA.1
4
1. Many Consumers Will Continue to Receive Validation Notices
The scope of the amendment providing an exception to the
validation notice requirements to the FDCPA is very limited.125
Therefore, although section 802 of the FSRRA will prevent
debtors from receiving the § 1692g validation notices in some
126circumstances, the exception for litigating attorneys does not
appear to render the validation requirement "meaningless," as its
opponents would argue.127 Because the amendment only exempts
formal legal pleadings from the definition of initial communication
under § 1692g, whenever a consumer receives initial
correspondence from the debt collector other than a complaint, he
will be entitled to receive the § 1692g validation notices with such
communication or within five days thereafter. 28 It is therefore
only in the limited circumstance in which a debt collector's first
contact with the debtor is the initiation of a lawsuit where the
129consumer will not receive the benefit of the validation notices.
Thrifts, and Credit Unions: Hearing on H.R. 3505 Before the S. Committee on
Banking, Financing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 17 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing
on H.R. 3505] (statements of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer
Federation of America; Margot Saunders, Of Counsel, National Consumer Law
Center; Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest
Research Group). The argument of these consumer groups is that because the new
amendment effectively prohibits consumers from disputing the validity of the debt in
writing when a complaint is the initial communication from the debt collector, it
necessarily forces consumers to challenge the amount and existence of the debt in a
court of law. Because many consumers in this situation cannot afford to hire an
attorney and do not want to undertake the task of representing themselves, the
consumer advocates argue the likely result of the amendment, therefore, is that
consumers will have default judgments entered against them for debts that they do
not owe. Id.
124. See infra notes 128-34, 151-54 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
127. Thomas, 392 F.3d at 918.
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2000); FSRRA, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802(a), 120 Stat.
1966 (2006).
129. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g; FSRRA § 802(a).
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Although the new amendment does create an exception to
the validation requirement of § 1692g for litigating collection
attorneys, the limited nature of the exception ensures that many
consumers will continue to receive validation notices.30 Because
many creditors outsource the collection of their overdue accounts
to third-party debt collectors, the initial contact between the debt
collector and the consumer in this context is not likely to be a
lawsuit."' Before undertaking the time and expense of initiating a
lawsuit, the third-party debt collector will most likely notify the
debtor of the existence of the debt, and inquire as to how he or she
intends to repay it. 3 2 Therefore, there will almost certainly be
other communications in this context before the initiation of a
lawsuit,'133 and debtors will thus continue to be entitled to receive
the § 1692g validation notice requirements.1
34
The only situation in which a debtor will not receive the §
1692g validation notices under the new amendment is where the
creditor attempts to collect his own debts rather than outsourcing'- . 35
this activity to a third-party debt collector. Certainly, some
creditors conduct the collection of all their accounts in-house and
only turn matters over to an attorney when the debt needs to be
reduced to a judgment. 3 6 Under the FDCPA, any contact with the
consumer by the creditor himself does not constitute a
130. See id.
131. See Debt Validation: The Ultimate Weapon Against the Collection Agencies,
CREDIT INFO CENTER, http://www.creditinfocenter.com/rebuild/debt-validation.shtml
(last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
132. See Jim Heath, Using a Debt Collection Agency, in How TO COLLECT
BUSINESS DEBTS (1990), available at http://www.viacorp.com/DebtBook.html#agency
(Debt collectors "[w]ill usually negotiate hard with the debtor to try to get a
settlement before they start legal action."). Presumably, a creditor could simply
assign the debt to an attorney who could file a lawsuit without undertaking any prior
collection activity. However, not only is this not practical from the standpoint of the
time and expense involved, it is also not a viable option for creditors since consumers
will view such a tactic as reflective of character and practices of the creditor (as
opposed to the attorney filing suit). Consumers will refuse to enter into transactions
with such a creditor, and the creditor will therefore be forced to cease the operation
of its business. See infra Part V.B(2).
133. See Heath, supra note 131.
134. See FSRRA, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802(a), 120 Stat. 1966 (2006).
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g; FSRRA § 802(a).
136. See Aaron Larson, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Aug. 2003,
available at http://www.expertlaw.com/ library/consumer/fair debtcollection.html#3.
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"communication" for purposes of the § 1692g validation notices. 37
When a creditor is attempting to collect his own debts, therefore,
the service of a complaint by an attorney is likely to be the initial
communication to the debtor for purposes of § 1692g. 138 Because
the FSRRA expressly states the service of complaint does not
constitute an initial communication under § 1692g, there likely will
not be an "initial communication" triggering the validation notices
in this context. 13' Thus, only in the limited circumstance where a
creditor hires a collection attorney solely for litigating a collection
case against a debtor after the creditor has unsuccessfully
attempted to collect the debt himself will the consumer be
deprived of the § 1692g validation notices. 14°
2. The Free Market as a Consumer Protection
Although many consumers will continue to receive
validation notices even with the new amendment to the FDCPA ,14
as previously discussed, some will no longer receive these
142notices. However, the limited context in which consumers will
not receive validation notices under the provisions of the FSRRA
ensures that they will continue to enjoy sufficient protection
against the unfair collection practices of debt collectors in
accordance with the terms and purpose of the FDCPA.
143
In contrast to the uncertainty surrounding the extent to
which attorneys should fall within the purview of the FDCPA,
creditors themselves have never been subject to the Act's
strictures. In its original form, the FDCPA distinguished
between creditors and third-party debt collectors, subjecting only
the latter to its requirements, and this distinction has been
137. See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,
1696; 123 CONG. REC. 10,242 (1977) (statement of Rep. Annunzio); Simon, supra
note 2, at 395 (stating that the requirements of the FDCPA do not apply to creditors
themselves).
138. See Simon, supra note 2, at 395.
139. See FSRRA § 802(a).
140. See id.
141. See supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2000).
144. See id. § 1692a(6)(A); Simon, supra note 2, at 394-95.
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reaffirmed throughout the history of the Act. 145 The rationale
behind such a distinction lies in the accountability of creditors to
those to whom they lend money.146 As Congress indicated by
exempting creditors from the requirements of the FDCPA,
consumers need no more protection from creditors seeking to
collect their own accounts than that afforded by the free market
system.147 Because consumers have a choice from which creditors
they will choose to borrow, creditors are forced to avoid unfair and
improper practices when attempting to collect their own debts.48
Unlike third-party debt collectors who generally "work on
commission and have no concern for a debtor's opinion of them,"
it is extremely important for creditors to "maintain goodwill"
among the consumers with whom they are dealing.49 "If creditors
harass or otherwise use unscrupulous collection tactics, their future
sales will undoubtedly suffer."'5 ° By holding creditors accountable
for their collection practices in this way, the free market system
ensures adequate consumer protection where collection efforts are
undertaken by a creditor rather than a third party acting on the
creditor's behalf.
1 5 1
Under the terms of the new amendment, the only
circumstance in which collection attorneys will no longer be
required to serve the § 1692g validation notices is where their
initial communication with the debtor is the service of a lawst.12
Accordingly, the validation exemption created by the new
amendment is confined to situations in which the bulk of the
collection activity is conducted by the creditor as opposed to a
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A); Simon, supra note 2, at 395.
146. See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,
1696; 123 CONG. REC. 10,242 (1977) (statement of Rep. Annunzio); Simon, supra
note 2, at 395.
147. See Simon, supra note 2, at 395 (noting that consumers do not need any
additional protection from creditors seeking to collect their own debts because
consumers can "police" creditors themselves in this context).
148. See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,
1696; 123 CONG. REC. 10,242 (1977) (statement of Rep. Annunzio); Simon, supra
note 2, at 395.
149. Simon, supra note 2, at 395.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. FSRRA, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802(a), 120 Stat. 1966 (2006).
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third party acting on its behalf."3 Because the free market system
effectively inhibits unfair collection practices in this context,
validation notices are not necessary to ensure adequate consumer
protection. 154 Therefore, the new amendment's disposal of
validation notices in this limited circumstance does not entail
decreased consumer protection under the FDCPA.
Opponents of the new amendment contend it will allow
litigating collection attorneys to obtain default judgments against
debtors for debts they do not even owe since debtors will no
longer have an opportunity to dispute the debt outside of a
courtroom. However, such a conclusion neglects the incentives
the free market system places on creditors to avoid this very type
of behavior.'57 As indicated previously, consumers are capable of
"policing" the collection activities of creditors themselves through
the mechanism of the free market. The ability of consumers to
freely choose the creditor from whom they want to borrow money
forces creditors to treat consumers fairly in their lending as well as
collection activities if they want to stay in business. 9 Accordingly,
the abuse suggested by the amendment's opponents is curtailed by
the fact that the creditor in this context has a significant interest in
ensuring the validity of the debt prior to hiring an attorney to
initiate a lawsuit.' 6° Thus, the incentives provided by the free
market override any temptation creditors may have to take unfair




153. See supra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
154. See Simon, supra note 2, at 395 (noting that the application of the FDCPA is
unnecessary where the creditor is attempting to collects its own debts because the
free market ensures adequate consumer protection in this context).
155. See id.
156. Hearing on H.R. 3505, supra note 121.
157. See Simon, supra note 2, at 395.
158. Id.
159. See id.






Throughout the history of the FDCPA, Congress and
courts have struggled with the Act's applicability to attorneys. 162 In
less than twenty years, debt collection attorneys went from being
completely exempt from the requirements of the FDCPA to being
subject to each of the Act's strictures regardless of how minimal or
limited their involvement was in the debt collection process.63
This evolution imposed significant compliance burdens on
collection attorneys whose sole involvement in the process was
litigating the debt, especially in the context of the validation
notices required by § 1692g.'6
As the latest development in the ongoing debate, section
802 of the newly enacted FSRRA marks a significant retreat from
the Supreme Court's sweeping application of the FDCPA to all
attorneys in Heintz v. Jenkins."' By creating an exemption to the §
1692g validation requirement for litigating collection attorneys, the
new amendment eliminates the unnecessary burden imposed upon
collection attorneys within this context 6 without significantly
altering the protection afforded consumers under the FDCPA.67
Despite the apparent utility of such an amendment in
balancing the interests of attorneys and consumers under the
FDCPA, it is unlikely consumer rights advocates or commercial
legal organizations will allow this latest development to be the
last.' 68 Indeed, the applicability of the FDCPA to attorneys is
likely to continue to be characterized by the sort of ebb and flow•169
that has marked the first thirty years of the Act's existence.
BRIAN KOONTZ
162. See supra notes 19-25, 30-37, 45-58 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 19-20, 54-58 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 37-42, 81-83 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 128-34, 151-54 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 3505, supra note 121 (indicating the dissatisfaction
of consumer groups with what they perceive to be the effects of the new
amendment).
169. See supra notes 19-25, 30-37, 45-58 and accompanying text.
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